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l. INTRODUCTION 
Because the equal protection1 and due process2 guarantees of the U.S. 
Constitution protect individuals against impermissible governmental action, 
they do not ordinarily provide protection against discriminatory treatment 
by private actors. 3 This means that, where applicable,4 constitutional em-
ployment discrimination claims may be brought by federal, state, or local 
government employees. Such claims may be brought under Section 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 as amended-commonly referred to as 42 U.S.C. 
§1983, or Section 1983. When considering such a claim, a court determines 
whether the governmental employer has deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional 
right, including guarantees of equal protection and due process. 5 
State and local government employees may bring sex or gender stereo-
typing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,6 
whereas federal employees may bring them under the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.7 In contrast, individuals who face discrimination by a 
private employer must bring such claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII). 8 Subject to certain limitations, public employees 
may also pursue claims under Title VIP Private and public employees who 
experience discrimination based on lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender 
(LGBT) status may pursue claims of sex discrimination, particularly where 
the discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes.10 
1U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1, which reads in relevant part: "No State shall ... deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." , 
2U.S. CoNST. amend. V, which reads in relevant part: "No person shall be ... deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
3See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) ("[t]he provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... all have reference to State action exclusively"). 
4In some instances, government employees may not have recourse to constitutional claims. 
Notably, federal employees with discrimination claims that are substantively covered by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may only bring statutory claims and may not supplement 
with constitutional claims. See Section II. infra. 
542 U.S. C. §1983 (providing statutory liability for{he deprivation of constitutional rights). 
For a detailed discussion of Section 1983 claims generally, see BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL 
GROSSMAN, & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 36 (The Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866 and 1871), §III. (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW]. 
6See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated 
public schools). 
7Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (equal protection applies to the federal 
govemment through the Due Process Clause because "discrimination may be so unjustifiable 
as to be violative of due process"). 
8Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII (July 2, 1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e et 
seq.). See Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) for a discussion of Title VII. 
9 See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW chs. 22 (Employers), §§l.B.3. and II.; 25 
(Charging Parties and Plaintiffs), §II. C.-D.; and 32 (Federal Employee Litigation). 
10See generally Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The discussion in 
this chapter is limited to federal laws. Public and private employees may also have similar and/or 
additional claims under state fair employment practices laws. See Chapter 20 (Survey of State 
Laws Regarding Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace). 
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II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TITLE VII AND CoNSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Although public employees are protected by the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, the vast majority of 
federal, sex-based employment discrimination claims by LGBT employ-
ees are brought as statutory challenges under Title VIIY State and local 
government employees have the option of bringing constitutional claims 
in tandem with discrimination claims under Title VII. 12 In contrast, the 
Supreme Court has held that federal employees with discrimination claims 
that are substantively covered by Title VII may only bring statutory claims 
and may not supplement with constitutional claims.U However, federal 
employees are not permanently barred from raising constitutional claims 
for employment discrimination. Where the substance of the discrimination 
11 See Section I. supra. 
12See, e.g., Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634, 642, 115 FEP 949 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. de-
nied, 568 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 868 (2013) (in holding that Title VII is not the sole remedy for 
a city employee who alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of sex, including 
sexual harassment, the court concluded "that while Title VII provides the exclusive remedy 
for employment discrimination claims created by its own terms, its exclusivity ceases when 
the employer's conduct also amounts to a violation of a right secured by the Constitution" (cit-
ing the following circuit court decisions that are in agreement: Back v. Hastings on Hudson 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117-19, 93 FEP 1430 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding plaintiff 
stated a claim for sex discrimination based on gender stereotypes under the Equal Protection 
Clause and quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 49 FEP 954 (1989), for 
the proposition that" 'stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part' 
in an adverse employment decision"); Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83, 91 FEP 1227 
(4th Cir. 2003) (reinstating plaintiff's religion-based §1983 claim for violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Thigpen v. Bibb County, Ga., Sheriff's Dep't, :?-23 F.3d 1231, 1239 
(11th Cir. 2000) (reinstating plaintiffs' raced-based §1983 equal protection claim and noting that 
"discrimination claims against municipal employers are often brought under both Title VII and 
the equal protection clause (via section 1983)"); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522, 84 FEP 
291 (6th Cir. 2000) (reinstating plaintiffs' raced-based §1983 equal protection claim); Notari 
v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 587, 59 FEP 739 (lOth Cir. 1992) (reinstating plaintiffs' 
sex-based §1983 equal protection and due process claims and related Title VII claim); Johnston 
v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1575-76, 51 FEP 467 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (affirming trial verdict for plaintiff on his retaliation-based Title 
VII and §1983 First Amendment claims); and Ratliffv. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 624, 
41 FEP 296 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that "[b]oth the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII 
grant 'public sector employees independent rights to be free of [governmental] employment 
discrimination'" and affirming the posttrial dismissal of plaintiff's sex and race-based claims 
under Title VII and race-based equal protection claim))); see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 
119 F.3d 563, 74 FEP 625 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light 
of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 1001, 79 FEP 1696 (1998) (upholding as 
actionable plaintiff's sex discrimination claims based on gender stereotypes under Title VII 
and Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving plaintiff who was perceived to be a gay man); 
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 94 FEP 273 (6th Cir. 2004) (same, in a case involving 
trans gender plaintiff); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 95 FEP 994 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1003 (2005) (affirming verdict of jury that found sex discrimination against 
transgender plaintiff under both Title VII and Equal Protection Clause, although, because the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed the verdict under Title VII, the court did not address the defense's argu-
ment that the jury charge with respect to the equal protection claim was erroneous). 
13Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 12 FEP 1361 (1976) (holding that 
Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy" for discrimination claims that are fully 
covered by Title VII). 
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claim is not covered by Title VII, courts have held that federal employees 
may bring constitutional claims. 14 
III. APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII REASONING 
TO CoNSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Because sex discrimination is prohibited under Title VII and the Con-
stitution, federal courts have relied on reasoning in the former context when 
analyzing the latter, and vice versa.15 This means that the watershed rationale 
of the Supreme Court's Title VII decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 16 
applies to constitutional sex discrimination claims as well. 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII's prohi-
bition against discrimination because of sex includes discrimination based 
on gender stereotypingP Importing Price Waterhouse's Title VII holding 
to cases involving constitutional claims about sex discrimination, federal 
courts have ruled that the constitutional prohibition against discrimination 
based on sex also prohibits gender stereotyping.18 
14See, e.g., Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415, 
36 FEP 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Nothing in [the Title VII legislative] history even remotely 
suggests that Congress intended to prevent federal employees from suing their employers for 
constitutional violations against which Title VII provides no protection at all."); Gunning v. 
Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423, 1431 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (permitting federal employee's First Amend-
ment claim because it is not cognizable under Title VII). 
15 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577, 94 FEP 273 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[t]he facts 
[plaintiff] has alleged to support his claims of gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII 
easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution"); Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170, 
84 FEP 1445 (S.D. Ohio 1998) ("discrimination claims [under] the Equal Protection Clause[] 
can be analyzed under the Title VII framework"); Beall v. London City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 
2006 WL 1582447, at *7, 98 FEP 1425 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (same); Dawkins v. Richmond County 
Schs., 2012 WL 1580455, at *4 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2012) (same); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 152 n.lO (N.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Section 1983 sexual harassment 
claims that are based on a 'hostile environment' theory ... are governed by traditional Title VII 
'hostile environment' jurisprudence." (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Nanda v. Board 
of Trustees ofUniv. oflll., 303 F.3d 817, 829-30, 89 FEP 1616 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 
U.S. 902 (2003) ("the teaching of an unbroken phalanx of decisions by this and other courts" 
is that "the aim of Title VII, as well as the method for proving violations of Title VII, are the 
same as those of the Equal Protection Clause"), with Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 
F.3d 946, 951, 88 FEP 500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002) (declining "to import 
Title VII employment discrimination standards into ... traditional equal protection analysis" 
when the standards differ from each other). 
16490 U.S. 228, 49 FEP 954 (1989). 
17490 U.S. at 250-52. Price Waterhouse is discussed extensively in Chapters 14 (Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 39 (Law and Culture in the Making of Macy v. Holder). 
18See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315-20, 113 FEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011) (ap-
plying Title VII's gender stereotyping rationale to the Equal Protection Clause and ruling that 
discrimination against transgender individual because of gender nonconformity constitutes sex 
discrimination under U.S. Constitution); Smith, 378 F. 3d at 577 (same, noting that" '[t]o prove a 
violation ofthe equal protection clause under §1983, [a plaintiff] must prove the same elements 
as are required to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII' "). 
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IV. CoNSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BY LGBT EMPLOYEES 
Constitutional discrimination claims by LGBT employees often rely 
significantly on case law interpreting federal statutes that prohibit sex 
discrimination, including Title VII.19 In Price Waterhouse, the Court 
clarified that gender stereotyping is an actionable form of sex discrimi-
nation. 20 Because gender stereotyping is often the root of discrimination 
faced by LGBT employees, the case lays a foundation for sex-based 
employment discrimination claims by these individuals. Since Price 
Waterhouse, several courts have held that discrimination against LGBT 
individuals is a form of sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII and 
the Equal Protection Clause. For lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) liti-
gants, the discrimination may be linked to comments or views about the 
person's gendered appearance or about stereotypes of sexuality linked 
to a person's sex (e.g., a man should only form physical and emotional 
attachments to a woman) and/or marriage (e.g., a woman should marry 
a man). For transgender employees, the discrimination may be linked 
to stereotypes about physical manifestations of gender identity (e.g., a 
person assigned the sex of male at birth should not have a body or ap-
pearance congruent with that of someone who is female) or stereotypes 
about the permanence of an individual's assigned sex (e.g., that persons 
should not change their sex from their assigned birth sex). 
Apart from Title VII, a number of courts have held that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation deprives employees of equal protection of the 
laws, as will be discussed in the next section. 
A. Constitutional Claims by LGB Employees 
1. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Against LGB Employees 
Although many courts have held that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is not discrimination based on sex under Title VII because sexual 
19Title VII and many of the cases discussed in this chapter are discussed extensively in 
Chapter 14 (Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964). Other federal sex discrimination statutes 
may also inform constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 
F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that bank customer who was a biological male but 
dressed in female attire when he requested a loan application had successfully stated a claim 
for discrimination on the basis of sex and gender stereotyping in violation of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, which specifically prohibits discrimination in a credit transaction on the basis 
of sex); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198-1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that trans-
sexual prisoner successfully stated a claim of discrimination based on sex under the Gender 
Motivated Violence Act against a prison guard who allegedly attempted to rape the prisoner 
because the guard's actions were motivated by the victim's gender and "animus based on the 
victim's gender"); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding 
that professor's sexual conduct directed at transsexual student constituted discrimination on 
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
20Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52. 
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orientation is not a protected class expressly enumerated in Title VII, 21 "[t]he 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not so limited by 
express category. On the contrary, ... the Equal Protection Clause protects 
similarly situated individuals from invidious and irrational discrimination 
based on sexual orientation."22 For example, in Quinn v. Nassau County Police 
Department, 23 the court sustained a jury verdict finding that a police officer 
was denied the equal protection of the laws where he was tormented over a 
nine-year period with pornographic cartoons-which depicted and labeled 
him a homosexual, a child molester, a sadomasochist, and a transvestite-
"and photographs, anti-gay remarks, and barbaric 'pranks.' "24 His supervi-
sors did nothing to stop the harassment, which "transcended hostile, coarse 
and boorish behavior," and, in fact, some supervisors participated in the 
misconduct. One supervisor testified that the cartoons were not offensive. 25 
In reaching its decision, the court "recognized that government action in 
21 See Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section V., for a discussion 
of the cases. 
22Quinn v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359, 80 FEP 286 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999). Accord Emblen v. Port Authority of N.Y./N.J., 2002 WL 498634, at *7, 89 FEP 233 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (following reasoning in Quinn in case involving claim of discrimination based 
on perceived homosexuality); Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323, 89 
FEP 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (following reasoning in Quinn and Emblen); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 
92 F.3d 446, 451, 454-55, 456 n.8, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (gay student entitled to trial on his 
claims that he was denied the equal protection of laws based on his sexual orientation and sex 
where he alleged school administrators took minimal steps to protect him from rampant physi-
cal and verbal abuse because of his sexual orientation, mocked him, and told him "that 'boys 
will be boys' and ... if he was 'going to be so openly gay,' he should 'expect' such behavior 
from his fellow students;" among other things, the court observed that "[w]e find it impossible 
to believe that a female lodging a similar complaint would have received the same response"; 
"[w]e are unable to garner any important governmental objective that is furthered by the al-
leged gender discrimination in this case, and the defendants do not offer us one"; "[t]here can 
be little doubt that homosexuals are an identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our 
society"; and "[w]e are unable to garner any rational basis for permitting one student to as-
sault another based on the victim's sexual orientation, and the defendants do not offer us one". 
(footnote omitted)); Schroeder v. Hamilton School Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951, 88 FEP 500 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974 (2002) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants 
where plaintiff teacher failed to establish factual basis for his sexual orientation discrimination 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; distinguishing Nabozny); Miguel v. Guess, 112 Wash. 
App. 536, 554, 51 P.3d 89, 97, 89 FEP 990 (2002), review denied, 148 Wash. 2d 1019, 64 P.3d 
650 (2003) (following reason in Nabozny and Quinn and "hold[ing] that a state actor violates a 
homosexual employee's right of equal protection when it treats that person differently than it 
treats heterosexual employees, based solely upon the employee's sexual orientation"); Dawkins 
v. Richmond County Schs., 2012 WL 1580455, *4-5 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2012) (holding that 
plaintiff stated a viable claim for sexual orientation discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause, but not under Title VII); O.H. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 2000 WL 33376299, at 
*10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2000) (noting that "[a] number of district courts and courts of appeals 
have also held that a plaintiff may recover under § 1983 for discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause"); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. School 
Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 152-53 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (sexual harassment based on the sexual 
orientation of plaintiff student actionable under Equal Protection Clause; following Quinn). 
23 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 80 FEP 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
2453 F. Supp. 2d at 350-51. 
25Id. at 350-52, 357. 
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[employment] cannot survive a rational basis review when it is motivated by 
irrational fear and prejudice towards homosexuals."26 The court concluded 
that "conduct by police department officers, supervisors and policy makers 
contributing to, failing to address, and outright condoning harassment of 
homosexuals amounts to impermissible 'status-based [conduct and policy] 
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relation-
ship to legitimate state interests.' "27 
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Form of Sex Discrimination 
Against LGB Employees 
The Constitution and Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination 
provide relief for LGB claimants. As the federal district court explained in 
Centola v. Potter, 28 discrimination based on sexual orientation may in fact be 
"motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexuality defined gender norms."29 
For instance, a lesbian woman may be discriminated against because she 
fails to conform to the gender stereotype of forming a romantic relationship 
with a man. And, as the Supreme Court explained in Price Waterhouse, 30 
discrimination based on gender norms constitutes unlawful sex discrimina-
tion. The Centola court explained that "[i]f an employer acts upon stereotypes 
about sexual roles [i.e., that a man should only have a romantic relationship 
with a woman] in making employment decisions, or allows the use of these 
stereotypes in the creation of a hostile or abusive work environment, then 
the employer opens itself up to liability under Title VII's prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex."31 Thus, animus against LGB employees 
may by itself constitute sex discrimination. 
26 I d. at 357. Accord Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 
2d 1160, 1174-75, 84 FEP 1445 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (in ruling after a bench trial that a school 
. board's "purported reason for ... nonrenewal of [plaintiff teacher's employment contract] was 
pretextual[] and ... [based on] his sexual orientation," the court observed "since governmental 
action 'must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose,' and the desire 
to effectuate one's animus against homosexuals can never be a legitimate governmental pur-
pose, a state action based on that animus alone violates the Equal Protection Clause" (quoting 
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118 
(1998) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635, 70 FEP 1180 (1996))) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Beall v. London City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 2006 WL 1582447, at *6-11, 98 
FEP 1425 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (denying summary judgment for defendants and following Glover 
in case involving teacher claiming she was not reappointed because of her sexual orientation). 
2753 F. Supp. 2d at 358 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635, 70 FEP 1180 (1996)). 
Accord Lathrop v. City of St. Cloud, 2012 WL 185780, at *7, 114 FEP 509 (D. Minn. 2012) 
(holding that there are no "legitimate governmental concerns [that] would justify treating a 
homosexual police officer differently in terms of discipline than a heterosexual officer"). 
28 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 87 FEP 1780 (D. Mass. 2002) (Title VII case). 
29 183 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11 (denying employer's summary judgment because gay employee 
"carried his summary judgment burden of proving that his co-workers and supervisors discrimi-
nated against him because of his sex by using impermissible sexual stereotypes against him"). 
30Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 49 FEP 954 (1989). 
31 Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
15-8 GENDER IDENTITY & SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION CH. 15.IV.A.2. 
As explained in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
Section VI., in addition to the gender-stereotyping theory for proving sex 
discrimination, a few tribunals have applied a similar theory of association 
discrimination. That theory has been used previously to find discrimination 
against employees based on their associations with persons of a different 
color, national origin, race, or religion, and has now been applied to claims 
by employees who have been discriminated against based on their same-
sex relationships. In association cases, the discrimination arises because of 
the discriminator's distaste for the combination of the protected statuses of 
two associated people. That distaste is often premised on stereotypes. For 
example, in the case of race, if an employer does not approve of biracial 
marriages and takes adverse actions based on those marriages, then the 
married employees have been discriminated against because of their race. 
Had the employees' race been the same as their spouses' race, they presum-
ably would not have suffered the adverse actions. Similarly, in the case of 
employees who are married or are otherwise in a relationship with persons 
of the same sex, application of the association theory of sex discrimination 
would mean those employees presumably would not have been subjected 
to adverse actions had they been the opposite sex. 
As Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section VI., 
explains, the few cases to address this issue are divided, although the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-the federal admin-
istrative agency responsible for enforcing employment antidiscrimination 
laws-appears to support application of the association theory to all classes 
protected by Title VII. Although few federal courts have yet to expressly 
address sex-based association claims, and some cases have rejected sex 
discrimination claims brought by LGBT litigants,32 recent analysis from the 
EEOC and some courts suggests viability for future claims. For instance, 
in Castello v. Donahoe,33 the EEOC concluded that a lesbian employee had 
"alleged a plausible sex stereotyping case which would entitle her to relief 
under Title VII if she were to prevail."34 The Commission found that the 
employee had successfully argued that her manager "was motivated [to 
discriminate against her] by the sexual stereotype that having relationships 
with men is an essential part of being a woman."35 Similarly, in Veretto v. 
Donahoe,36 the EEOC held that a gay claimant could proceed with his sex 
discrimination claim against his employer. The employee alleged that he 
was subjected to a hostile work environment because his harasser learned 
he was marrying a man; and his harasser "was motivated by the sexual 
32For a detailed discussion of the cases, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964), Section V. 
332011 WL 6960810 (EEOC Dec. 20, 2011). 
341d. at *2. 
35ld. at *3. 
362011 WL 2663401 (EEOC July I, 2011). 
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stereotype that marrying a woman is an essential part of being a man, and 
became enraged when Complainant did not adhere to this stereotype."37 
In November 2013, in In re Fonberg,38 the Judicial Council of the Ninth 
Circuit held that U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) wrongly 
barred a federal employee from enrolling her same-sex domestic partner 
in a federal group health insurance plan. At the time, only different-sex 
married spouses could be enrolled. The plaintiff and her partner were in a 
registered domestic partnership under Oregon law. In Oregon, such part-
nerships are the equivalent of different-sex marriages. The court held that 
"[t]he distinction drawn by OPM based on the sex of the participants in the 
union amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex ... and ... constitutes 
a deprivation of due process and equal protection" under the U.S. Consti-
tution.39 In December 2013, in Kitchen v. Herbert,40 the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Utah held that Utah's ''Amendment 3," which prohibits 
permitting or recognizing same-sex marriages in Utah, violated the due 
process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. The court observed: 
[Utah] argues that Amendment 3 does not discriminate on the basis 
of sex because its prohibition against same-sex marriage applies equally to 
both men and women. The Supreme Court rejected an analogous argument 
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). In Loving, Virginia argued that 
its anti-miscegenation laws did not discriminate based on race because the 
prohibition against mixed-race marriage applied equally to both white and 
black citizens. Id. at 7-8. The Court found that "the fact of equal application 
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification 
which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes 
drawn according to race." Id. at 9. Applying the same logic, the court finds 
that the fact of equal application to both men and women, does not immu-
nize Utah's Amendment 3 from the heightened burden of justification that 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires of state laws drawn according to sex.41 
In January 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the Kitchen decision pend-
ing disposition of an appeal in the Tenth Circuit. 
Centola, Castello, Veretto, and similar cases are discussed more thor-
oughly in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), in connec-
tion with Title VII claims.42 
37/d. at *3. 
38736 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013). 
39/d. at 903 (emphasis added). Accord In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 577-78 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (in holding that §3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violated a same-
sex married couple's right to equal protection because it denied them the right to file a joint 
bankruptcy petition that a different-sex married couple would have been permitted to file, the 
court observed that "DOMA is gender-biased because it is explicitly designed to deprive the 
Debtors of the benefits of other important federal law solely on the basis that these debtors are 
two people married to each other who happen to be men."). 
40961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), stay granted, 571 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). 
41 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
42 See in particular Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section V.B.2.a. 
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3. Sex Discrimination Claims by LGB Employees Based on Gender 
Stereotyping and Sexual Harassment 
Regardless of whether or how future courts interpret claims of sex 
discrimination brought by LOB litigants, many courts have recognized 
actionable sex discrimination claims based on the Price Waterhouse gender-
stereotyping theory, including in cases involving same-sex harassment. 43 
Although the vast majority of the same-sex sexual harassment cases involve 
statutory discrimination claims, federal courts often import reasoning from 
Title VII cases to constitutional cases that raise similar claims.44 
In Doe v. City of Belleville,45 the Seventh Circuit held that numerous 
comments concerning a plaintiff's perceived homosexuality or gender 
nonconformity constituted actionable evidence of gender stereotyping. The 
plaintiff was referred to as a "bitch" (or as a particular coworker's "bitch"), a 
"fag," and a "queer";46 was asked by coworkers whether he was "a boy or a 
girl''~7; and was "singled out for harassment because, in wearing an earring, 
he departed from what his co-workers deemed within the realm of appro-
priate masculine appearance.''~8 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff 
had an actionable claim of sex discrimination against his male coworkers 
under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that "one need 
only consider for a moment whether [the plaintiff's] gender would have been 
questioned for wearing an earring ... if he were a woman rather than a man. 
It seems an obvious inference to us that it would not.''~9 The court had earlier 
remarked that "[i]n view of the overt references to [the plaintiff's] gender 
and the repeated allusions to sexual assault, it would appear unnecessary 
to require any further proof that ... gender had something to do with this 
harassment; the acts speak for themselves in that regard."50 I~ rejecting the 
employer's defense that the harassment was based on sexual orientation and 
not sex, the court observed that "considerable overlap [exists] in the origins 
of sex discrimination and homophobia" and that "a homophobic epithet like 
43 See, e.g., Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F. 3d 257, 263, 86 FEP 553 
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he gender stereotypes 
method for proving same-sex sexual harassment is based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins"). 
For an in-depth discussion of the gender-stereotyping theory, same-sex sexual harassment 
claims, and additional case law under Title VII, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964), Section V. 
44 See Sections I. and II. supra. 
45 119 F.3d 563, 74 FEP 625 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 1001, 79 FEP 1696 (1998). City of 
Belleville is discussed extensively in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
Section V.C.l.c. 
46 City of Belleville, 119 F. 3d at 567, 577. 
47Jd. at 566-68. 
48Id. at 596-97. 
49 Id. at 581-82. 
50 119 F.3d 563, 577, 74 FEP 625 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion infight of Oncale, 523 U.S. 1001, 79 FEP 1696 (1998). 
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'fag,' for example, may be as much of a disparagement of a man's perceived 
effeminate qualities as it is of his perceived sexual orientation."51 
The Seventh Circuit's judgment in City of Belleville was vacated and 
remanded by the Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Services,''52 in which the Supreme Court ruled 
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. The case 
settled before the Seventh Circuit was able to consider it again. However, 
the Court's holding in Oncale likely did not call into question the Seventh 
Circuit's holding that gender stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination. 53 
As evidenced by district courts that have continued to adhere to the Seventh 
Circuit's holding, the Price Waterhouse gender stereotyping theory of sex 
discrimination remains an actionable claim. 54 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit's holding in City of Belleville, the Ninth 
Circuit, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,S5 held that verbal 
abuse of a male employee by his male coworkers constituted actionable 
sex discrimination under Title VII. Coworkers referred to the male plaintiff 
using female pronouns, commented that he carried his tray "like a woman,'' 
criticized him for not having sexual intercourse with a female friend of his, 
and called him a "faggot" and "female whore."56 The court reasoned that 
these comments were based on the perception that the plaintiff is effeminate 
and failed to conform to traditional male norms. ''At its essence," the court 
stated, "the systematic abuse directed at [the plaintiff] reflected a belief that 
[he] did not act as a man should act."57 Thus, the court concluded that "this 
51 119 F.3d at 593 n.27. 
52 City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001, 79 FEP 1696 (1998) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 76 FEP 221 (1998)). · 
53Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5, 86 FEP 553 (3d 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002). 
54 See id., citing three district court decisions from within the Seventh Circuit. As explained 
in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Sections V.C.l.b. and V.C.6., other 
circuit courts have held, subsequent to Oncale, that same-sex harassment claims may be based 
on the gender-stereotyping theory. 
55256 F.3d 864, 86 FEP 336 (9th Cir. 2001). 
56256 F.3d at 870, 874 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57/d. at 874. See also Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262-63 (holding that "a plaintiff may be able to 
prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that 
the harassment was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of 
his or her gender," but finding that plaintiff was not discriminated against because he was a 
man); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "[o]ther courts have 
suggested that gender discrimination-discrimination based on failure to conform to gender 
norms-might be cognizable under Title VII," but not reaching the merits of this theory of sex 
discrimination because plaintifffailed to plead sufficient facts); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204, F.3d 
1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Price 
Waterhouse, "[ d]iscrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman 
is forbidden under Title VII"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261, 
n.4, 81 FEP 161, 9 AD 1555 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that based, on Price Waterhouse, "just 
as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she 
did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, ... a man can ground a claim on evidence 
that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of 
masculinity," but holding, among other things, that former employee waived this argument by 
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verbal abuse was closely linked to gender"58 and constituted unlawful gender 
stereotyping. Federal courts around the country have similarly concluded that 
read together Price Waterhouse and Oncale indicate that same-sex sexual 
harassment may be proven "by showing that the harassment was motivated 
by the plaintiff's failure to conform to gender stereotypes."59 
B. Constitutional Claims by Transgender Employees 
Before Price Waterhouse, most federal courts held that transgender 
employees did not have a viable sex discrimination claim under Title VII, 
reasoning that Title VII's reference to "sex" referred to the biological dif-
ferences between men and women rather than failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes.60 These courts concluded that Title VII did not protect trans-
gender plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs were discriminated against because 
of their gender nonconformity or because of antitransgender animus, and 
not because they were biologically male or female.61 For instance, in Ulane 
v. Eastern Airlines,62 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have 
a valid Title VII sex discrimination claim because she was discriminated 
against "not because she is a female, but because [she] is a transsexual."63 
However, after Price Waterhouse, federal courts widely rejected the 
rationale of these earlier cases. Recent cases have nearly uniformly held that 
the reasoning of Price Waterhouse permits transgender plaintiffs to assert 
a sex discrimination claim based on their nonconformity with gender ste-
reotypes.64 As the Eleventh Circuit observed in 2011 in Glenn v. Brumby,65 
"since the decision in Price Waterhouse, federal courts have recognized 
with near-total uniformity that 'the approach in [cases such as] Ulane ... 
failing to raise it below); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (D. Mass. 2002) (denying 
employer's summary judgment because gay employee "carried his summary judgment burden 
of proving that his co-workers and supervisors discriminated against him because of his sex 
by using impermissible sexual stereotypes against him"). 
58 Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874. 
59Klen v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 2007 WL 2022061, *16 (D. Colo. July 9, 2007) 
(in applying the Price Waterhouse gender stereotyping theory to same-sex sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, the court granted summary judgment 
for the employer due to plaintiff's failure to produce sufficient evidence of discrimination). For 
additional cases, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Sections V.C.l.b. 
and V.C.6. 
6°For a detailed discussion of the cases, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964), Section B.l. In addition, EEOC Commissioner Feldblum traces the history of Title VII 
jurisprudence relating to trans gender individuals in her essay in Chapter 39 (Law and Culture 
in the Making of Macy v. Holder). 
61Jd. 
62742 F.2d 1081, 35 FEP 1348 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). 
63742 F.2d at 1087. The Ulane decision is discussed further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Sections IV.B.l.e. 
64For a detailed discussion of the cases, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964), Sections IV.B.3., IV.C., and IV.D., and Chapter 39 (Law and Culture in the Making 
of Macy v. Holder). See also Chapter 16 (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973), Section III.E.2., for a discussion of the court decisions holding that 
"sex" encompasses more than anatomic sex. 
65663 F.3d 1312, 113 FEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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has been eviscerated' by Price Waterhouse's holding that 'Title VII's refer-
ence to "sex" encompasses both the biological differences between men 
and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a 
failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.' "66 
One case in the Tenth Circuit stands in contrast to the wave of courts 
identified by the Eleventh Circuit. In 2007, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Authority,67 the Tenth Circuit rejected a transsexual woman's sex discrimina-
tion claim, holding that, pursuant to Title VII and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause, discrimination based on the plaintiff's 
status as a transsexual was not cognizable because it was not discrimination 
based on "sex."68 Furthermore, the court refused to find a Title VII violation 
under the plaintiff's Price Waterhouse theory of discrimination because it 
held that the employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing 
the plaintiff. 69 Therefore, even accepting arguendo that the plaintiff, as a 
biological male, was "discriminated against for failing to conform to social 
stereotypes about how a man should act and appear,"70 the Tenth Circuit 
explained that the employer was not liable under Title VII because it prof-
fered a legitimate reason for her termination.71 
Aside from the Tenth Circuit's holding in Etsitty, subsequent to Price 
Waterhouse a vast majority of courts have held that transgender plaintiffs 
may assert sex discrimination claims based on their nonconformity with 
gender stereotypes. Most of these cases involve statutory sex discrimination 
claims, as opposed to constitutional sex discrimination claims.72 
However, in 2004, in Smith v. City ofSalem,73 the Sixth Circuit applied 
Price Waterhouse's gender stereotyping rationale to a constitutional sex 
discrimination claim by a transsexual employee. The Sixth Circuit held that 
a transsexual firefighter could not be suspended because of the fact that he 
"[failed] to conform to sex stereotypes by expressing less masculine, and 
more feminine mannerisms and appearance"74 because this constituted un-
lawful discrimination based on sex, in violation of both the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title VIP5 The following year, the Sixth Circuit reiterated its 
holding in Smith. In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,76 the court held that at trial 
66663 F.3d at 1318 n.5 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573, 94 FEP 273 
(6th Cir. 2004)). The Glenn decision is discussed further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964), Section IV.D.l. 
67502 F.3d 1215, 101 FEP 1357 (lOth Cir. 2007). 
68502 F.3d at 1221-22. 
69 !d. at 1223-25. 
70Id. at 1223. 
71 Id. at 1225. The Etsitty decision is discussed further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964), Sections IV.B.3.d. and IV.E. 
72For a detailed discussion of the cases, see Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964), Sections IV.B.3., IV. C., and IV.D., and Chapter 39 (Law and Culture in the Making 
of Macy v. Holder). 
73 378 F.3d 566, 94 FEP 273 (6th Cir. 2004). 
74378 F.3d at 572. 
75 !d. at 578. 
76401 F. 3d 729, 95 FEP 994 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1003 (2005). The Smith decision 
is discussed further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section IV.B.3.d. 
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the transsexual plaintiff had successfully proved a claim of sex discrimination 
based on the plaintiff's failure to conform to sex stereotypes.77 Accordingly, 
the court upheld the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.78 
The Eleventh Circuit soon followed suit. In 2011, in Glenn v. Brumby/9 
the court applied Price Waterhouse's gender stereotyping rationale to a con-
stitutional sex discrimination claim by a transgender employee. The plain-
tiff, Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, 80 was fired from her job as an editor in the 
Georgia General Assembly's Office of Legislative Counsel when she began 
transitioning from male to female. Glenn alleged that Sewell Brumby, her 
former supervisor, "discriminat[ed] against her because ofher sex, including 
her female gender identity and her failure to conform to the sex stereotypes 
associated with the sex [Brumby] perceived her to be."81 Holding that "dis-
criminating against someone on the basis of his or her gender nonconformity 
constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause,"82 
the Eleventh Circuit found that Brumby failed to advance a "sufficiently 
important governmental purpose" by firing Glenn.83 Significantly, the Court 
explained that "[a] person is defined as transgender precisely because of the 
perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes."84 The 
Court concluded, "discrimination against a transgender individual because 
of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it's described 
as being on the basis of sex or gender."85 
The EEOC has also held that discrimination on the basis of an employ-
ee's transgender s-tatus, regardless of how it is manifested, is sex discrimina-
tion. In 2012, in Macy v. Holder,86 the EEOC held that "discrimination based 
on gender identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status" violates Title 
VIJ.87 Therefore, "a transgender person who has experienced discrimination 
based on his or her gender identity may establish a prima facie [statutory] 
case of sex discrimination through any number of different formulations."88 
The plaintiff in Macy had variously framed her claim as one based on sex, 
77401 F.3d at 735-38. 
78The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on both her equal protection and Title VII 
claims. Because the Sixth Circuit upheld the Title VII verdict, it had no need to address the 
defendant's appeal with respect to the equal protection verdict. I d. at 741. The Barnes decision 
is discussed further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section IV.B.3.d. 
79663 F.3d 1312, 113 PEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011). The Glenn decision is discussed further 
in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section IV.D.l. 
80See Chapter 6 (Glenn v. Brumby: Forty Years After Grossman) for an essay by Ms. 
Glenn about her termination, litigation, and ultimate reinstatement. 
81 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82Id. at 1316. 
83 I d. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84663 F.3d 1312, 1316, 113 FEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 
85663 F.3d at 1317. 
862012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). The Macy decision is discussed further 
in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section IV.D.2., and in EEOC 
Commissioner Feldblum's essay in Chapter 39 (Law and Culture in the Making of Macy 
v. Holder). 
872012 WL 1435995, at *1. 
88Jd, at *10. 
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sex stereotyping, gender identity, change of sex, and her trans gender status. 89 
As the EEOC explained, "[t]hese different formulations are not, however, 
different claims of discrimination .... Rather, they are simply different ways 
of describing sex discrimination."90 
The fact that an employer's animus was rooted in employees' "change of 
sex" as distinct from their transgender identity or their gendered appearance 
does not obviate protections under sex discrimination laws. For example, in 
Schroer v. Billington,91 the district court for the District of Columbia rea-
soned that just as "[ d]iscrimination 'because of religion' easily encompasses 
discrimination because of a change in religion," so, too, does discrimination 
because of sex encompass discrimination because of a change in sex.92 In 
Macy, the EEOC cited Schroer and similarly noted that just as discrimina-
tion based on a transition in religion violates Title VII, discrimination based 
on a transition in gender also violates the statute.93 Therefore, although an 
employer may claim that it discriminated against a transgender employee 
not because of his or her sex or gender but because of his or her sex or 
gender transition, tribunals have rejected this rationale and held that the 
discrimination remains unlawful under Title VII. 
V. LEVEL OF ScRUTINY APPLIED TO CoNSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
BY LGBT EMPLOYEES 
Although courts disagree on the appropriate level of scrutiny for an 
equal protection discrimination claim based on a government employee's 
sexual orientation, courts agree that governmental discrimination based on 
sex, including gender stereotyping, is subject to "intermediate scrutiny" 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (for state or 
local employees)94 or the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (for federal 
employees).95 
The standard for intermediate scrutiny for constitutional sex discrimi-
nation claims was first outlined by the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren.96 
89 !d. at *2-4. 
90/d. at *10. 
91 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 104 FEP 628 (D.D.C. 2008). The Schroer litigation is discussed 
further in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), Section IV. C., and Chapter 22 
(Trans gender Discrimination Claims: A Plaintiff Perspective on Proofs and Trial Strategies). 
92 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306. 
93Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012). 
94See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating a state statute that 
classified men and women differently while explaining that gender-based classifications "must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives"); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-56 (1996) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny and holding that the Commonwealth of Virginia violated equal protection by failing 
to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding women from the citizen-soldier 
program offered at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI)). 
95Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the guarantee of equal protec-
tion applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
96429 u.s. 190 (1976). 
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If the government treats men and women differently, then it has the burden 
of justifying this discriminatory treatment by demonstrating that its justi-
fication is "exceedingly persuasive" and showing that its action "at least ... 
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."97 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Virginia 98-commonly 
referred to as the VMI case, because the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) 
was a party to the case-the government's justification under intermediate 
scrutiny "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response 
to litigation."99 In VMI, the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that it main-
tained an all-male military academy to further "diversity" of educational 
opportunities.100 The Supreme Court recognized that this justification was 
insincere and rejected it, explaining that diversity of educational options is 
not achieved by providing a "unique educational benefit only to males."10I 
Similarly, in Glenn v. Brumby,102 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
defendant's insincere proffered justification for terminating the transgen-
der plaintiff's employment. The employer voiced a purported concern that 
"other women might object to [the plaintiff's] restroom use."103 Affirming 
the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held that this speculative concern did 
not reflect the actual justification for the plaintiff's termination and thus 
did not withstand intermediate scrutiny because it was not a "sufficiently 
important government purpose" to fire her.104 
Moreover, the government's rationale for its discriminatory classification 
or action may not rely on gender stereotypes.105 In VMI, the Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that the government "must not rely on overbroad general-
izations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females" to justify the classification or discrimination based on sex. Io6 "Ever 
since the Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based 
classifications, its consistent purpose has been to eliminate discrimination 
97 VMI, 518 U.S. at 524, 533 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 724 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
98 518 u.s. 515 (1996). 
99 VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
100Id. at 539-40. 
101Id. at 540 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 
102663 F.3d 1312, 113 FEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011). 
103663 F.3d at 1321. 
104Jd. 
105See, e.g., VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (explaining that the state "must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females"); id. at 565 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that "the State should avoid assum-
ing demand [or interest in attending the military institute] based on stereotypes"); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (reasoning that "the weak congruence between gender and 
the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent" necessitated applying heightened 
scrutiny); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982) (explaining 
that "the purpose" of heightened scrutiny is to ensure that sex-based classifications rest upon 
"reasoned analysis rather than ... traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper 
roles ofmen and women"). 
106 VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. 
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on the basis of gender stereotypes."107 Citing VMI, the Glenn court held that 
the employer's discriminatory treatment of a trans gender plaintiff violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because the employer discriminated against the 
plaintiff on the basis of gender nonconformity or gender stereotyping.108 The 
court reasoned that the employer's gender stereotyping did not constitute 
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the discriminatory conduct.109 
Therefore, if an LGBT employee brings a viable sex discrimination claim 
based on gender stereotyping, then a court is likely to evaluate that claim 
with intermediate scrutiny. 
Although federal courts concur that discrimination on the basis of sex 
is subject to intermediate scrutiny, case law pertaining to the level of scru-
tiny appropriate for equal protection claims of discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation remains unsettled. In Romer v. Evans,110 the Supreme 
Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that discriminated 
against gay and lesbians. The Court invalidated the state amendment on 
equal protection grounds because it lacked a "rational relationship to legiti-
mate state interests."111 Invoking the importance of "careful consideration" 
to determine the constitutionality of the state amendment,112 the Court used 
what scholars have now recognized as "rational basis with bite."113 
However, the Romer Court did not formally state whether sexual orien-
tation discrimination is always subject to rational basis review or "rational 
basis with bite."114 Nonetheless, following Romer, several courts have ap-
plied rational basis review-the least demanding level of scrutiny-to equal 
protection claims of sexual orientation discrimination.115 In contrast, other 
107Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319, 113 FEP 1543 (11th Cir. 2011}. 
108See 663 F. 3d at 1319-21 ("Brumby testified at his deposition that he fired Glenn because 
he considered it 'inappropriate' for her to appear at work dressed as a woman and that he found 
it 'unsettling' and 'unnatural' that Glenn would appear wearing women's clothing" and because 
Brumby was disconcerted by "'a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman[.' He ad-
mitted] that his decision to fire Glenn was based on 'the sheer fact of the transition.' Brumby's 
testimony provides ample direct evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Brumby 
acted on the basis of Glenn's gender non-confor,mity."). 
109 !d. at 1321. 
"
0517 U.S. 620, 70 FEP 1180 (1996). 
" 1 517 U.S. at 632 (holding that "Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even [rational basis 
review]"). 
112/d. at 633 ('"[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful con-
sideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision' "). 
113See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 761-62 (2011), 
available at www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/voll24 _yoshino.pdf; see also ERWIN CHEMER-
INSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICIES 673 (3d ed. 2006). 
"
4See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-35. 
" 5See, e.g., Pederson v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333, 115 FEP 
1228 (D. Conn. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. _ (2013) ("Having considered all four factors, 
this Court finds that homosexuals display all the traditional indicia of suspectness and therefore 
statutory classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to a heightened form of judi-
cial scrutiny. However, the Court need not apply a form of heightened scrutiny in the instant 
case to conclude that [Section 3 of] DOMA violates the promise of the equal protection as it 
is clear that DOMA fails to pass constitutional muster under even the most deferential level 
of judicial scrutiny." (footnote omitted)); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 574, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2011) (in holding that a same-sex married couple may file a joint bankruptcy petition, the court 
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courts have applied a higher level of scrutiny to assess equal protection 
sexual orientation discrimination claims.U6 
In 2013, in United States v. Windsor, 117 the Supreme Court applied 
what appeared to be "rational basis with bite" when assessing the consti-
tutionality of Section 3 of the federal Defense ofMarriage Act (DOMA).118 
Section 3 prevented the U.S. government from treating same-sex married 
couples equally to opposite-sex married couples because it mandated that 
only marriages between a man and a woman would be recognized by the 
federal government. 119 The Court struck down Section 3, explaining that 
"[i]n determining whether a law is motivated by an improper animus or 
purpose, ' [ d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially require 
held Section 3 of DOMA does not survive either rational or heightened scrutiny); Golinski v. 
U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995-96, 1002, 114 FEP 819 (N.D. Cal. 
2012), cert denied, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013), appeal dismissed, 724 F.3d 1048 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Section 3 of DOMA does not survive either rational or heightened scrutiny); 
Dragovich v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944, 954, 964, 115 FEP 466 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (invalidating Section 3 ofDOMA under rational basis review); Obergefell v. 
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986-93 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Ohio's prohibition on recognizing 
same-sex marriages lawfully performed jn other jurisdictions does not survive either rational 
or heightened scrutiny); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1210-15 (D. Utah 2013), 
stay granted, 571 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (in holding that Utah's prohibitions against 
permitting and recognizing same-sex marriages violated the due process and equal protection 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court applied rational basis review); Equality 
Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 75 FEP 115 (6th Cir. 1997), 
reh 'g en bane denied, 75 FEP 1763 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (applying rational 
basis and upholding city charter amendment that removed homosexuals from class of people 
protected by local nondiscrimination ordinances; although in the minority, six judges voted to 
rehear the case en bane, arguing the panel decision was contrary to the holding in Rome1~. In 
January 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the Kitchen decision pending d~sposition of an 
appeal in the Tenth Circuit. 
116See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 570 U.S. 
_, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 118 FEP 1417 (2013) ("[W]e conclude that review of Section 3 ofDOMA 
requires heightened scrutiny"); Massachusetts v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 
1, 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. _· _, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887 (2013) (in holding 
that §3 of DOMA is unconstitutional, the court explained that "Supreme Court equal protec-
tion decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported justifications where minorities are 
subject to discrepant treatment and have limited the permissible justifications .... [The] Supreme 
Court decisions in the last fifty years call for closer scrutiny of government action touching 
upon minority group interests and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern."); 
Pederson, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (in holding that DOMA is unconstitutional, the court found 
"that homosexuals display all the traditional indicia of suspectness and therefore statutory clas- ~ 
sifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny");~ 
Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96, 1002 (Section 3 ofDOMA does not survive either rational 
or heightened scrutiny); In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 574, 579 (same); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
at 986-93 (Ohio's prohibition on recognizing same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other 
jurisdictions does not survive either rational or heightened scrutiny); see also Griego v. Oliver, 
316 P.3d 865, 880-84 (N.M. Sup. Ct. 2013) (in striking down New Mexico's ban on same-sex 
marriage as violative of New Mexico's constitution, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, 
citing in support, among other cases, the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Windsor, 
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
117570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 118 FEP 1417 (2013). 
118Pub. L. No. 104-199, §3 (Sept. 21, 1996) (codified at l U.S.C. §7). 
1191 U.S.C. §7 ("the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife"). 
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careful consideration.' "120 The Court did not fully discuss the level of 
scrutiny it applied to determine the unconstitutionality of the statutory 
provision. However, by citing Romer's "careful consideration" language, the 
Court invoked a form of "rational basis with a bite." Therefore, although 
it remains uncertain, it seems that the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
evaluating an equal protection claim based on sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is at least "rational basis with bite."121 However, most successful 
equal protection employment discrimination claims by LGBT employees 
are permutations of gender stereotyping sex discrimination claims that 
are undoubtedly subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
The Windsor case is discussed further in Chapters 16 (The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) and 
37 (Employee Benefit Issues). In Chapter 16, Windsor is considered in con-
nection with the argument that the exclusion of gender identity disorders 
(including transsexualism) and transvestism from the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act violates equal protection, either under 
the heightened scrutiny that courts apply to gender and sexual minorities 
or under the lower, rational basis review that courts apply to classifications 
based on disabilities. In Chapter 37 (Employee Benefit Issues), Windsor is 
referenced in connection with the discussion of the pernicious effect that 
DOMA had on employee benefits. 
In any event, ev~n if it is assumed arguendo that claims based on gen-
der identity or sexual orientation are not subject to heightened scrutiny, the 
cases discussed in Section IV.A.l. supra demonstrate that courts have regu-
larly upheld employees' discrimination claims premised on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause under the rational basis standard. 
120 Windsor, 570 U.S. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 118 FEP at 1425 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 633, 70 FEP 1180 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court also ob-
served that "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of 
that group." Id. (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). 
121 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479-84 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(in holding that it violates equal protection standards to excuse prospective jurors from a jury 
based on their sexual orientation, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court in Windsor 
applied heightened, not rational basis, scrutiny). For a discussion for pre-Windsor cases, see 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw ch. 11 (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), §III. B. 
